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JUDICIAL REGULATION OF CONTINGENT FEE
CONTRACTS
ERIC M. RHEIN
C ONTINGENT FEE CONTRACTS for legal services I are
of special concern to the law.2 This concern arises from
the judicial and American Bar Association recognition that
many clients have little experience negotiating fees with law-
yers, 3 the public resentment of the occasionally exorbitant
contingent fee recoveries by attorneys, and public distrust of
the legal profession.5 One consequence of this special concern
A contingent fee contract for legal services is a contract under which the amount
or the payment of the attorney's fee is dependent upon the outcome of the litigation
or matter. Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 191, 193 (1981). A contingent fee for a plaintiff's law-
yer is based upon an agreement between the lawyer and client under which the law-
yer agrees to prosecute the client's claim in exchange for a specified portion of the
amount recovered. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (5th ed. 1979). A contingent fee for a
defendant's lawyer may be dependent upon a specified percentage of an amount of
money saved the client by his lawyer's efforts. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 191 (1981).
2 See, e.g., Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., 602 F.2d 1105 (3rd Cir. 1979) (holding
that a district court has authority to set aside contingent fee agreements when it finds
that fee agreements would result in unreasonable fees); Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa.
86, 156 A.2d 865 (1959) (voiding a contingent fee contract under which an attorney
was to receive a fee upon procuring a pardon for a prisoner).
3 F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 22 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as F. MACKINNON].
See Clermont & Currivan, Improving the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV.
529, 598-99 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Clermont & Currivan].
' See McKay, Legal Education: Law, Lawyers, and Ethics, 23 DE PAUL L. REV.
641, 644 (1974). Lawyers ranked ninth place, above law enforcement officials, televi-
sion news reporters and plumbers, in a poll measuring public perception of profes-
sional credibility. Id. An American Bar Association poll showed in 1974 that most
people polled believed that attorneys charge too much for legal services, and that
many types of legal matters could be more efficiently handled by accountants, bank
officers, and insurance agents. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 231-34
(1977). Chief Justice Warren Burger has noted that even though public perception of
the extent of unethical practices in the legal profession is unfounded, the bar should
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is that courts have frequently stepped into the attorney-client
relationship to review the propriety of contingent fee
contracts.'
Courts have balanced the need to protect the lawyer's right
to contract freely with clients' with the need to protect un-
wary clients from attorney overreaching8 so that the integrity
of the bar can be maintained.9 This comment will focus on the
historical and doctrinal framework of the theory underlying
the use of contingent fees, the social utility of contingent fee
arrangements, and the possibility for abuse inherent in con-
tingent fee arrangements. Case law illustrating judicial control
of contingent fee contracts will then be discusssed in terms of
the fiduciary, ethical, and reasonableness standards of review
to show that judicial scrutiny of contingent fee contracts,
along with enforcement of the legal profession's ethical rules,
can ensure that contingent fee arrangements are fairly negoti-
ated and that lawyers utilizing contingent fee arrangements
are well compensated.10
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL UTILITY OF CONTIN-
GENT FEE CONTRACTS
take action to curb public resentment of lawyers. Burger, The Role of the Law School
in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 377, 379-80 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Burger].
* See, e.g., Hoffert v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the district court validly exercised its authority to supervise the amount of attor-
neys' contingent fee in wrongful death suit).
See Dunn* v. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., 602 F.2d 1105, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1979).
8 See Matter of Reisdorf, 80 N.J. 319, 403 A.2d 873 (1979) (finding that an attorney
had charged an excessive contingent fee).
' See generally Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 378 F. Supp. 423, 426 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (holding that court-awarded statutory attorneys' fees in antitrust suits must
not be overgenerous, in order to maintain public respect for and confidence in the
bar).
" Any discussion about the advantages and problems of contingent fee arrange-
ments is likely to stir strong feelings. This comment, however, will examine all views
on each aspect of judicial regulation of contingent fees. It is important to keep in
mind Professor Radin's early caveat that "[clontingent fees are neither good nor bad.
They are good when they assist an otherwise helpless litigant to secure his right
against a powerful antagonist. They are bad when they deprive this litigant of a sub-
stantial part of the compensation for his injury." Radin, Maintenance By Cham-
perty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 75 (1935).
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A. English Law
English common law advocates could not lawfully enter
into contingent fee contracts." The amount of the advocates'
fee was to be set - even though payment of it could not be
enforced' 2 - without regard to the possible outcome of the liti-
gation. 3 An agreement to litigate in exchange for a promise of
a share in a party's recovery was defined as champertous 4
and therefore illegal.' The English believed that if advocates
were permitted to contract with parties for contingent fees a
greater number of frivolous cases would be brought, because
parties would be free of the monetary risks and costs of un-
founded litigation."
The early English doctrines of maintenance 7 and barratry' s
also reflected the English policy against allowing non-party
participation in lawsuits.'9 Champerty, maintenance, and bar-
ratry, however, were not originally aimed at preventing law-
yers from having monetary interests in litigation, but were in-
tended to prevent the powerful feudal lords from controlling
litigation to which they were not parties.20 Contingent fees
were thus unlawful because they were perceived as promoting
11 R. ARONSON, ATtORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 76(1980) [hereinafter cited as R. ARONSON]. The Federal Judicial Center commissioned
Professor Aronson's study. Id. at 1.
12 J. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 234 (1916). Even today it is illegal
in England for barristers to sue clients for recovery of fees. L. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
170 (1953). Instead, since solicitors make fee arrangements with clients for barristers,
English law permits solicitors to enforce payment of the barristers fees by suing cli-
ents. F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 11-12.
" F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 10.
'4 R. ARONSON, supra note 11, at 76.
1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES 82 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. SPEISER].
JB j. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 130 (1978).
'7 Maintenance is "[a]n officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to
one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute
or defend it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 860 (5th ed. 1979).
'$ Barratry is "[tihe offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and
suits .. "Id. at 137.
1" F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 35-38. At English common law, non-parties who
participated in litigation in which they had financial interests could be criminally
prosecuted. See generally Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 823
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
20 F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 36.
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unfounded litigation purely for private profit.21
In addition to refusing to permit the use of contingent fees,
early English courts controlled the activities of the members
of the bar in other ways. The power of courts to regulate law-
yers' activities initially was asserted in 1292 when King Ed-
ward I appointed the Lord Chief Justice and Associate Jus-
tices of the Court of Common Pleas, and gave them the power
to appoint attorneys.22 This act of the king was the basis for
direct judicial control of the legal profession.23 In fact, the
barristers' conduct was regulated with such particularity as to
include personal matters such as the length of their beards
and the cut of their dress.24 Thus, regulation of lawyers by
judges was a clearly established practice in early English com-
mon law courts.
B. United States Law
Initially, many courts in the United States followed the
traditional English common law rule and condemned contin-
gent fee contracts as being champertous. 25 Eventually Ameri-
can courts accepted contingency fee contracts,26 finding that
the evils so feared in England did not exist in American law-
yers' contingent fee arrangements.2 7 In Bentinck v. Frank-
lin,28 for example, the Texas Supreme Court, in approving the
use of a contingent fee contract by a plaintiff's lawyer in a suit
for the recovery of land, stated that:
[11f a lawyer helps his client to recover lands from the posses-
2' J. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 234 (1916).
22 INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CONTINGENT FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY
AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1957).
23 II HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 490 (1872).
24 INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CONTINGENT FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY
AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1957) (citing II HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 264 (1872)).
" See, e.g. Lafferty v. Jelly, 22 Ind. 471 (1864); Roberts v. Yancey, 94 Ky. 243, 21
S.W. 1047 (1893); Hinckley v. Giberson, 129 Me. 308, 151 A. 542 (1930); Butler v.
Legro, 62 N.H. 350 (1882); Orr v. Tanner, 12 R.I. 94 (1878).
6 T. FINMAN, CIVIL LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 99 (1966).
27 See Combs, The Contingent Fee Contract, 28 TEx. B.J. 949 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Combs].
20 38 Tex. 458 (1873).
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sion of another, and even takes a part of the land for his fee, if
the right of his client is clear to the land, we are unable to see
any immorality or breach of professional ethics in the
transaction.29
There were three reasons for the legalization of contingent
fee contracts in the United States. First, Americans generally
regarded the concept of "profession" as being aristocratic and
anti-democratic. 30 Americans did not share the English dis-
dain for "trade" 31 and instead chose to allow ordinary princi-
ples of supply and demand to govern the attorney-client fee
relationship. 32 Second, unlike the the English view of litiga-
tion, Americans did not regard lawsuits as social evils,3 and
contingent fees were viewed as a desirable means of providing
access to the courts for those who otherwise could not afford
to hire counsel.34 Finally, the use of contingent fees tended to
mitigate the harsh effect on the indigent litigant of the
"American Rule" of attorneys' fees,35 which held that the win-
ning party in a lawsuit could not recover money to pay his
attorney from the losing party.3 6 Contingent fee contracts
therefore made it possible for the poor litigant to obtain ac-
cess to the justice system in civil cases, for the reason that if
he recovered no monetary judgment, he owed his attorney no
29 Id. at 462. The United States Supreme Court first recognized contingent fee con-
tracts in Wylie v. Coxe, 56 U.S. 415 (1853) (permitting plaintiff's attorney to recover
a contingent fee of five percent on the amount recovered on the client's claim against
a foreign government). See also Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 46 (1884) (holding that
a contingent fee that constitutes fifty percent of a client's recovery is not extortion-
ate); Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 557 (1876) (approving the use of contingent fee
in claim against the United States).
80 Comment, The Contingent Fee: Disciplinary Rule, Ethical Consideration, or
Free Competition?, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 547 [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Con-
tingent Fee].
"1 At that time the English believed that "gentlemen" should not indulge in "trad-
ing class" speculation as to fee compensation. Combs, supra note 27, at 950.
82 Comment, The Contingent Fee, supra note 30, at 547.
3 F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 41.
34 M. GISNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH 73 (1931). See infra notes 38 - 44 and
accompanying text.
a See Combs, supra note 27, at 950.
86 Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND L. REv.
1216, 1226 (1967).
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fee.3 7
The rise of the contingent fee contract for legal services in
the United States has been attributed to the industrial and
transportation boom of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, which brought about previously unknown in-
cidence of industrial death and injury among members of the
working class,3 8 many of whom lacked the funds to hire coun-
sel. 9 Without an attorney willing to take such cases with the
accompanying risk of not being paid, those persons injured
during these economic boom periods would not have been able
to sue to recover damages for their work-related injuries.4
Thus, because many personal injury claimants lacked the
funds to pay retainer fees,4 the contingent fee provided the
only means by which some persons could obtain judicial de-
termination of their rights.2 This rationale for the contingent
fee still carries great weight today,3 considering that many
personal injury claimants often cannot afford to pay hourly-
31 Comment, The Contingent Fee, supra note 30, at 547.
a Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door, LITI-
GATION, Summer 1976, at 27, 30. [hereinafter cited as Corboy]; Combs, supra note 27,
at 999.
so J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 44 (1976). "An alarming proliferation of work
and transportation accidents, most often borne by those least able to afford lawyers'
fees, generated human tragedies which a profit economy and its legal doctrines exac-
erbated. Accident victims-and the surviving members of their families-were com-
pelled to bear the full burden for the risks inherent in dangerous work. Corporate
profit was the primary social value." Id.
40 R. ARONSON, supra note 11, at 77.
" S. SPEISER, supra note 15, at 84. Many personal injury plaintiffs, faced with lost
wages, mounting medical bills, and uncertain futures, are not able to finance prepara-
tion and investigation of a lawsuit, and are seldom able to pay retainer fees. Id.
", MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1980) (contingent fees
often "provide the only practical means by which one having a claim against another
can economically afford . . . the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute his
claim. . . ."); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564 F.2d 1097, 1105 (4th Cir.
1977) (holding that "sound public policy favor[s] the contingent fee as a method for
those less financially advantaged to vindicate their substantive rights"); Kreindler,
The Contingent Fee: Whose Interests Are Actually Being Served, 14 FORUM 406
(1979)[hereinafter cited as Kreindler] ("(tihe contingent fee makes it possible for an-
yone in our society to get the best lawyer. The client need not be a rich man. He need
only have a good case."); Kuhn, Collins & Rush v. Reynolds, 614 S.W.2d 854, 857
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e ) (contingent fees "provide the only
practical means by which" poor claimants can hire attorneys to prosecute claims).
43 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1977).
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based attorneys' fees."
In contingent fee arrangements, the attorney serves as an
insurer by bearing the risk of loss (i.e., nonpayment) in ex-
change for the possibility of receiving a portion of the client's
recovery.45 The attorney can better bear this risk of loss by
spreading it over a large number of contingent fee cases."
Viewed in this light, a single large contingent fee recovery by
a plaintiff's lawyer looks less exorbitant, considering that the
lawyer may not recover much, if any, money in other cases.41
The use of the contingent fee in the United States has been
widespread."8 Traditionally, plaintiffs' attorneys have con-
tracted for contingent fees in personal injury suits,4 9 collection
suits, 50 workmen's compensation cases,51 stockholder deriva-
tive suits,52 antitrust civil suits for damages,53 tax cases, 4 and
" See supra note 42.
45 R. ARONSON, supra note 11, at 49.
" See M. Schwartz & D. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in
Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1147-54 (1970). For instance, sup-
pose a lawyer represents ten personal injury claimants, under contingent fee con-
tracts, and spends an average of forty hours on each suit. Assume for the purpose of
this example that the attorney bills other clients by the hour at one hundred dollars
an hour. In order to make the attorney's time profitable, it would be necessary for the
attorney to recover more than $8,000 in each of five out of ten cases, so that the
attorney can "cover" for the time spent on the five cases in which no money is recov-
ered. One commentator, however, has argued that because most personal injury cases
are settled before trial, there is little doubt that the contingent fee lawyer will earn
some fee; the only contingency has to do with the amount of the fee. Grady, Some
Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, LITIGATION Summer 1976, at 20,23 [here-
inafter cited as Grady].
41 See Brown, Some Observations on Legal Fees, 24 Sw. L.J. 565 (1970). Often a
contingent fee lawyer may recover a large fee in one case, and will use that recovery
to finance the cost of his "losing" cases. This situation raises an ethical question of
whether it is fair to require, in essence, one client to finance an attorney's other cases.
See T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY 27-31 (Supp. 1978).
48 F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 29.
, See, e.g., Bounougias v. Peters, 49 Ill. App. 2d 138, 198 N.E.2d 142 (1964).
80 See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 25.
" See, e.g., Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 178 (1949).
62 See, e.g., Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Forty Wall Street Corp., 13 A.D.2d 118,
213 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961).
53 See, e.g., International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d
1255 (8th Cir. 1980).
" See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 27.
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will contests.5 5 More recently, attorneys have contracted for
contingent fees in defending tort claims,5 6 lien foreclosures, 7
tax cases,58 will contests," and ejectment suits.60
The contingent fee mechanism, by providing access to the
legal system to a significant number of people, has played an
indispensable role in recent progressive changes in the law. 1
For example, plaintiffs personal injury lawyers' efforts have
been the impetus for many developments in tort law, 2 such as
the abolition of governmental immunity in some states," ab-
rogation of intra-family immunity, 4 the creation of a wife's
right to recover for negligent impairment of her husband's
consortium,6 5 the creation of the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress," and creation of the right of parents to
recover for the wrongful death of an unborn child. 7 Often the
only way to finance these suits has been by the use of the con-
tingent fee, because many such claimants otherwise could not
have afforded to pay fixed or hourly fees. 8
II. POSSIBLE ABUSE OF THE CONTINGENT FEE
Despite no hard empirical data evidencing widespread
" See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1407, 1438 (1955).
" See Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W. 2d 331 (Iowa 1980) (strik-
ing down defendant lawyer's contingent fee which was based upon difference between
amount in plaintiff's prayer and jury verdict).
57 See, e.g., Walls v. Russell, 519 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1974).
" See, e.g., Board of Education v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996 (1926).
" See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 333 Mo. 478, 63 S.W.2d 146 (1933).
" See, e.g., Moss v. Richie, 50 Mo. App. 75 (1892).
' See Corboy, supra note 38, at 28.
62 See Lambert, The Trial Lawyers and the Changing Law, TRIAL, July-Aug. 1971,
at 2.
" See, e.g., Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968
(1971).
" See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971)
(abrogation of parent-child immunity).
" See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fl. 1971).
" See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68. Cal 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 68 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
(holding that a mother may recover for illness and shock resulting from seeing defen-
dant negligently cause her child's death).
'7 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971).
" See Lambert, The Trial Lawyers and the Changing Law, TIAL, July-Aug. 1971,
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abuse of the contingency fee,"' there is a general feeling on the
part of the public that lawyers charge too much7 0 and that
many contingent fee lawyers engage in unethical activities.7"
The area of fee disputes is perhaps the most serious problem
to be considered in the relationship between the public and
the bar.7 Even though the public's negative perception of the
legal profession may be unfoundeds7 3 the practice and appear-
ance of contingent fee abuse should be eliminated to the
greatest extent possible.74
One aspect of the contingent fee arrangement that is some-
times subject to abuse concerns the size of the percentage of
the client's recovery a lawyer retains under a contingent fee
contract. Sometimes that percentage may bear no relationship
to the time and effort invested by the attorney.7 5 For example,
in Ransom v. Ransom,7 s a will contest, the plaintiff's attorney
contracted with his client for a twenty-five percent contingent
6' C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1803 at 245 (Supp.
1981).
" Comment, The Contingent Fee, supra note 30, at 551.
7 J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 44-48 (1976).
71 R. ARONSON, supra note 11, at 5.
73 See Burger, supra note 5, at 379-80.
7 Id. at 380. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980),
which states that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety."
75 See, e.g., Suggested Changes in the Contingent Fee System, 19 FED'N INS. COUN.
Q. 76, 82 (1968) ("[tlhe Federation [of Insurance Counsel] objects . . . to abuses of
the contingent fee whereby lawyers obtain excessive fees completely out of relation-
ship to the value of [their) services either in time, effort or talent. . . ."); Grady,
supra note 46, at 21 ("there is little, if any, relationship between the efforts of the
[contingent fee] lawyer and the size of the verdict, once we assume a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. . . ."). In Mills v. Elta Corp., No. 80-2270 (7th Cir. 1981), a plaintiffs'
lawyer asked the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to award him $500,000 for 186
hours of work in a class action suit in which his clients did not recover any monetary
damages. The attorney justified the fee to the court, on oral argument, on the ground
that his telephone call to his "personal friend" Justice Thurgood Marshall extended
the period for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court; the attorney
also had worked on the plaintiffs' Supreme Court Brief. The plaintiffs won in the
Supreme Court, but, upon remand, did not win at trial. Nat'l. L. J., Oct. 5, 1981, at 2,
col. 3. See also Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 1, 1982, at 10A, col. 1, where it was re-
ported that an attorney who won a $12.5 million medical malpractice suit requested
that the trial court award him $6 million in fees, an amount the defense attorney
stated would be equivalent to $10,000 per hour for a forty hour work week.
" 70 Misc. 30, 127 N.Y.S. 1027 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910).
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fee." The attorney did not inform the client, during the fee
negotiations, of a previous decision rendered by an appellate
court in the client's favor in the course of the litigation.7 The
trial court later reduced the attorney's contingent fee, upon
the motion of the client's new attorney, from twenty-five to
seven and one half percent.79
In response to the criticism of the contingent fee that some-
times the amount of the fee bears no relationship to the attor-
ney's efforts, it has been argued that (1) the average personal
injury lawyer's income is less than that of the average member
of the bar;80 (2) contingent fee lawyers work the particular
number of hours required to maximize the client's recovery,81
instead of performing unnecessary work for a client and bill-
ing by the hour;82 and (3) since juries today have been award-
ing plaintiffs larger awards to account for inflation,8 there is a
tendency among some contingent fee lawyers to lower the per-
centage of a client's award from which their fees are derived.84
7 127 N.Y.S. at 1029-30.
" Id. at 1035-36.
79 Id. at 1037.
8o F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 182.
*! Kreindler, supra note 42 at 406.
' See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 4, at 567-69, where the authors note that
because the hourly paid the attorney has no direct economic reason to work the num-
ber of hours demanded by the client's best interests, it is quite possible that dispro-
portionately high hourly fees are charged. Overbilling by the hour attracted attention
recently in the Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, No. MDL 323 (E.D. Pa. 1981), where
plaintiffs' lawyers have accused each other of charging excessive hourly fees. Legal
Times of Washington, June 15, 1981, at 1, col. 1. It has been alleged that pretrial
conferences were attended by one or more attorneys from seven to seventeen firms,
where two or three attorneys would have sufficed, and that several firms representing
the same client would attend a single conference. At one such conference, three out of
four firms allegedly appeared on one client's behalf, billing a total of fifty and one-
half hours. One affiant stated that "[tihe requested fee . . . probably exceeds [the
lawyers'] clients' recovery." Id. at 32, col. 3. In total, the attorneys' fees requested in
the case amount to forty percent of the amount paid in settlement. Id.
8 See generally, W. PRossER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, CAsEs* AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 1192-97 (1976), in which the authors point out that often juries' awards
overcompensate plaintiffs, because jurors believe that doing so is necessary to ensure
that plaintiffs have enough money to properly redress their injuries after their ex-
penses and attorneys' fees are deducted. Id.
"' See Nat'l. L.J., June 22, 1981, at 1, col. 1, & 27, col. 3. Noted tort lawyer Melvin
Belli reports that he has lowered the amount of his contingent fee from one-third to
one-fourth of a client's recovery. Id. at 27, col. 2.
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Critics of the contingent fee have also argued that the con-
tingent fee mechanism encourages lawyers to file groundless
suits.85 Proponents of contingent fees, however, contend that
it is of no use for a contingent fee lawyer to bring a "losing"
cases6 because unlike the hourly-fee lawyer, a contingent fee
lawyer receives no compensation when his client does not re-
cover a money judgment.8 7 Therefore, it is against a contin-
gent fee lawyer's economic interest to waste his time on
groundless suits.
Moreover, in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,"8 the United
States Supreme Court held that the federal district courts
possess inherent power to assess attorneys' fees against law-
yers who willfully abuse the judicial process.8 This decision
could be instrumental in discouraging the filing of groundless
suits. In Roadway Express, counsel for the plaintiffs in a civil
rights class action suit refused to comply with the district
court's discovery and briefing orders.9 0 The defendant then
moved to dismiss the suit, and requested the district court to
award it attorneys' fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37.91 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's suits' and or-
dered the plaintiff's attorneys to pay the defendant's attor-
neys' fees, 93 citing the civil rights statute94 that allows the pre-
" K. Clermont & J. Currivan, supra note 4, at 571.
See Kreindler, supra note 42, at 407.
'7 See Pocius v. Halvorsen, 30 Ill.2d 73, 195 N.E.2d 137 (1963).
447 U.S. 752 (1980). The case is reviewed at Note, 60 B.U.L. REv. 950 (1980).
" 447 U.S. at 766.
90 Id. at 755.
91 Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) provides in part that:
If a party .. or an ... agent of a party ... fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery ... the court... may make such orders
in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following-
(B) An order. . . dismissing the action. . . or rendering a judg-
ement by default against the disobedient party.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the
attorneys advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorneys fees, caused by the failure, unless the court
finds the failure was substantially justified.
447 U.S. at 755.
Id. at 756.
42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e)-(5)(k) (1976) provides that "[i]n any action. . . under this
subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party. . . a reasona-
19821
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vailing party in civil rights litigation to recover attorneys' fees
as costs, and the federal statute that permits district courts to
assess costs against attorneys who multiply proceedings so as
to unreasonably increase costs.95 The Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court's decision,"' but the Supreme Court
affirmed and remanded, 1 holding that the federal district
courts have the inherent power to "assess attorneys fees for
the 'willful disobedience of a court order. .. ' or when the los-
ing party has acted in bad faith."98
Contingent fee lawyers are also accused of using improper
litigation tactics, such as permitting clients to lie on the wit-
ness stand.99 Recently, an investigative reporter went to thir-
teen personal injury lawyers in a large city, posed as an acci-
dent victim, and offered to testify in court to an undetectable
lie which would have the effect of producing a large award. 100
Several of the lawyers offered their services to the reporter. 101
Certainly, though, it is arguable that since all lawyers want to
win, 102 such fraudulent tactics are not exclusively used by con-
tingent fee lawyers. Moreover, stricter enforcement of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) would be a
more effective way to curb abuses than eliminating contingent
fees altogether. 03
Critics also allege that contingent fee lawyers are more
ble attorney's fee as part of costs ..
.,6 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) provides that "[a]ny attorney ...in any court of the
United States... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally such
excess costs."
" Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 559 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1979) aff'd and re-
manded, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
" Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980).
' Id. at 766. The court did not, however, allow the fees to be assessed against
counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(5)(k) (1976) or 42 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976), for the
reason that the statues make no mention of possible attorney liability for costs and
fees, and that legislative history evidencing such a Congressional intention was lack-
ing. 447 U.S. at 762-63.
" See Lehman v. Cameron, 207 Misc. 919, 139 N.Y.S.2d 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
'0 Berentson, Integrity Test, AM. LAW., May 1980, at 15-18, (cited in Burger,
supra note 5, at 383).
,0, Berentson, Integrity Test, Am. LAW., May 1980, at 15-18.
z01 K. Clermont & J. Currivan, supra note 4, at 570.
103 J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 129-30 (1978).
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likely to solicit clients than hour-billing attorneys.'1 The Su-
preme Court's decision in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion' °5 that state or local bar associations constitutionally may
discipline attorneys for soliciting clients in person' 01 reaffirms
the legal profession's power to effectively deal with the prob-
lem of solicitation. In Ohralik, an attorney had heard that two
young women had been injured in an automobile accident. 107
He visited both women personally,108 and both women agreed
to hire him on a contingent fee basis to represent them in
their claims against an insurance company.'0 9 Both clients
later discharged the attorney, and filed bar association griev-
ances against him.110 The disciplinary board found "1' that the
attorney had violated Disciplinary Rules 2-103(A)I" and 2-
104(A)." s The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the board's find-
ings,' 14 and the United States Supreme Court affirmed," 5
pointing out that solicitation may cause the individual solic-
ited distress and may invade an individual's privacy."'
Finally, contingent fee lawyers are criticized for sometimes
,o See Wasservogel, Report in the Judicial Investigation of "Ambulance Chasing"
in New York, 14 MASS. L.Q. 1, 21 (1928); See also Appleson, Solicitation Charges
Follow Hyatt Disaster, 67 A.B.A. J. 1442 (1981), where it is reported that the Mis-
souri Bar Association is investigating charges of solicitation in the wake of the Kansas
City Hyatt Regency Hotel disaster of July 17, 1981. One victim, injured when two
skybridges collapsed, received telephone calls from seven Kansas City lawyers the day
she returned home from the hospital. Other victims allegedly received similar com-
munications from out-of-state law firms. Id.
105 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
106 Id. at 449.
107 Id.
I" Id. at 449-50.
I1 d. at 450-51.
11 Id. at 452.
I' d. at 453.
"' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(a) (1980) provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner ... of him-
self ... to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer."
" Id. DR 2-104(a) provides that "[a] lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited
advice to a layperson that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not
accept employment resulting from that advice," with specified exceptions.
'" Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St.2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976),
aff'd, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
11 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
I d. at 465.
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breaching the fiduciary duty of trust inherent in the attorney-
client relationship. For example, in Bounougias v. Peters.7 an
attorney and a client entered into a contingent fee contract
under which the attorney was to receive one-third of the cli-
ent's recovery in a personal injury suit." 8 The lawyer recov-
ered a verdict for the client of $105,000,"' and the attorney
successfully defended the verdict in the court of appeals. 20
The opposing party indicated to the plaintiff's lawyer that it
might seek review in the United State Supreme Court, 2' and
the plaintiff's lawyer wrote his client, requesting that the cli-
ent come to his office alone. " At the meeting, the client
signed a letter, written by the attorney, which stated that the
attorney's contingent fee would be increased to fifty percent
of the client's recovery.'23 In fact, the defendants did not seek
review in the Supreme Court, the defendants paid the judg-
ment and the plaintiff's lawyer kept one-half of that
amount.' 24 The client then sued the attorney, alleging that the
second fee contract was void, since it was obtained by uncon-
scionable overreaching on the attorney's part. 25 The appellate
court reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for
the attorney, holding that material issues of fact existed as to
whether the second fee arrangement was fairly negotiated.2 6
The court first observed the general rule that attorney-client
fee contracts made during the existence of the fiduciary attor-
ney-client relationship are presumptively fraudulent. 21  The
court, in examining the circumstances of the instant case,
found that the evidence of the attorney's conduct created a
material issue of fact.128 The court held that issues of fact ex-
"1 49 Ill. App.2d 138, 198 N.E.2d 142 (1964).




In Id. at 143-44.
"' Id. at 144.
"'4 Id. at 144-45
I ld. at 145.
' Id. at 149.
27 Id. at 148.
I' Id. at 149.
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isted as to whether the fee contract was procured by uncon-
scionable overreaching because (1) the client could not read
English;1 29 (2) although the client was usually accompanied by
a member of his family on his visits to the attorney's office,
the attorney indicated in his letter to the client that the client
was to come to the attorney's office alone;130 (3) the attorney
rejected the client's request for time to discuss the second
contract with his family;13' and (4) the attorney failed to dis-
close to the client the client's legal position under the first fee
contract.'12
Another dimension of the fiduciary duties owed by attor-
neys to clients is that attorneys have a duty to fully inform
clients of alternative means of fee financing. 3' Many personal
injury clients have no previous experience with legal matters,
and negotiate with lawyers on unfamiliar territory.'3 4 Many
clients may lack the sophistication and education necessary to
understand fee arrangements and to deal with their lawyers at
arms' length.' 35 Even though the Supreme Court approved of
limited lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"'
lawyer advertisements inherently lack the capacity to convey
information as to the quality of a lawyer's services, and, for
that reason, may not help close the information gap.
In Matter of Reisdorf,'3 7 an attorney was held to have vio-





"2 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1980), which states
that lawyers should explain fully to clients "the reasons for the particular fee ar-
rangement" he proposes.
" Id. EC 2-19 cautions lawyers that clients "may have had little or experience
with fee charges of lawyers ...."
13 See Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), modifed sub nom,
Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Pete v. United Mine Workers
of American Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
where, in a class suit for coal miners retirement benefits, the Court of Appeals upheld
the district court's refusal to give effect to contingent fee agreements solicted without
court approval and after entry of summary judgement for the plaintiff class.
-- 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
1.7 80 N.J. 319, 403 A.2d 873 (1979).
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sive fee. 138 In that case, the attorney failed to inform his client
prior to execution of a contingent fee contract for a will con-
test that his fee could be paid by an award of the court out of
the decedent's estate.13 9 One alternative available to the client
was a state statute which permitted widows to apply to the
courts to receive money for will contest expenses upon a
showing of need."10 Another alternative, unknown to the cli-
ent, was a statute under which state probate courts had the
authority to order payment of a will proponent's litigation ex-
penses out of the decendent's estate.' The court held that
the attorney's contingent fee was clearly excessive in light of
his failure to disclose the important fee information to his
client. 1 2
III. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACTS
A. The Freedom of Contract Approach
Many courts hesitate to void or modify contingent fee
agreements between attorneys and clients because of the
strong feeling that, absent evidence of fraud or overreach-
ing," 8 the private contractual attorney-client relationship
should not be intruded upon." In Shannon v. Cross,"8 the
Michigan Supreme Court struck down a circuit court's rule
which absolutely prohibited the use of contingent fees, for the
reason that the circuit court's rule attempted to interfere with
an attorney's substantive right to contract freely with cli-
ents. " 6 The difficulty with the freedom of contract rationale,
' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1980) provides that
"[a] lawyer should not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or
clearly excessive fee." See infra notes 153-165 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of the Rule.
'39 403 A.2d at 877.
140 N.J. STAT. ANN. 3(A):3-24 (West 1978).
I'l N.J. CT. R. 4:42-9(a)(3) (1978).
14 403 A.2d at 877.
1' See Smith v. Kingsport Press, Inc., 263 F. Sup. 771, 773 (E.D. Tenn. 1966),
where the court stated that contingent fees must not be obtained by "fraud, mistake,
or undue influence, and must not be oppressive or extortionate."
"' See Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co. Inc., 602 F.2d 1105, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1979).
',' 245 Mich. 220, 222 N.W. 168 (1928).
140 Id.
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which fosters a "hands off" policy toward contingent fee
agreements, is that it assumes that the attorney and client
have agreed on the amount of the contingent percentage after
negotiation.4 7 Usually, though, there is little negotiation over
the terms of the fee contract. '4  The other flaw in the freedom
of contract approach is that it ignores the fact that lawyers'
activities historically have been subject to heavy regulation by
the courts.'49 The recent trend in the case law has been to
abandon the freedom of contract approach and examine the
propriety of fee arrangements in other ways. 150
B. The Ethical Approach
A number of courts have passed upon the validity of contin-
gent fee contracts by determining the ethical propriety of the
particular fee.' 5 ' These courts determine ethical propriety by
inquiring whether the attorney has acted within the confines
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. '5 Attor-
neys have an ethical duty to assure that the fees they charge
are fair,5 3 given the lawyer's societal role as practically the
only means of access to the legal system.' 54 The most impor-
tant ethical rule concerning fees is Code DR 2-106,155 which
147 R. ARONSON, supra note 11, at 18.
148 F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 22.
'" See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., Krause v. Rhodes, 640 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1981) (reasonableness ap-
proach); Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1980) (ethical
approach); Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374
(1960)(court rule appraoch).
,81 See Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973) modified sub nom, Kiser v.
Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Comment, Judicial Power Over Con-
tingent Fee Contracts: Reasonableness and Ethics, 30 CASE W. RES. 523, 530-31
(1980).
"' The CODE, however, is not binding on a court, but may be a guide for profes-
sional conduct to which a court can look in evaluting an attorney's conduct. In re
Kutner, 78 Ill.2d 157, 399 N.E.2d 963 (1979) (criminal lawyer charged client an un-
conscionable fee of $5,000 for defending client in simple battery prosecution).
'13 See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 9, where it is stated that "[b]y definition,
the [legal] profession holds the public interest to be superior to the self-interest of its
members; therefore, one of the historic conerns of all professions is to insure that the
economic advantages sought by individual members do not impair the ability of the
profession to carry out its functions." Id.
154 Id.
'a" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1980). See supra note
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prohibits lawyers from charging "illegal or clearly excessive"
fees."5 6 The Code provides that a fee is clearly excessive
"when a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a def-
inite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasona-
ble fee."'15 7
Few courts have had the opportunity to interpret Rule 2-
106,158 but the cases arising under this Rule usually involve
the question of whether a specified percentage of a client's re-
covery is "clearly excessive" per se. In Bennett v. Home In-
surance Co.,'59 for example, the court invalidated a contingent
fee contract which provided that the attorney was to receive
fifty percent of the client's recovery. 60 The court held that
one-third of the client's recovery is the maximum percentage
to which the plaintiff's attorney was entitled, and that the
fifty percent fee arrangement was !q'ethically improper and
legally invalid."'' Authority to the contrary is not recent,
162
although one court recently upheld a contingent fee contract
under which an attorney was to receive, for assisting his cli-
ents' collection efforts, one hundred percent of the first
$50,000 collected, fifty percent of the next $100,000 and
twenty percent of any amount above $250,000, because the cli-
138.
'"Id. DR 2-106(A).
'' Id. DR 2-106(B). The Rule provides:
Factors to be considered . . . in determining ... reasonableness of a
fee include ... (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and diffi-
culty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the
legal service properly. (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that
the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other em-
ployment by the lawyer. (3) The fee customarily charged in the local-
ity for similar services. (4) The amount involved and the results ob-
tained. (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances. (6) The nature and length of the professional relation-
ship with the client. (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the services. (8) Whether the fee is fixed
or contingent.
' See Altman, Lawyer, Defend Thy Fee!, 59 A.B.A. J. 79 (1973).
347 F. Supp. 451 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
I d.
'' Id. at 452.
142 See Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 45 (1884) (upholding a contingent fee of fifty
percent of the client's recovery); Pagano v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 137 F. Supp. 295
(N.D. Il. 1955) (upholding a contingent fee of fifty percent of the client's recovery).
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ents insisted upon the arrangement and there was no evidence
of attorney impropriety. 163
A few attorneys have been disbarred upon the finding of a
disciplinary board that they charge excessive contingent fees.
Those cases involved situations where the attorney made no
investigation of the facts of his client's case,6 where the at-
torney retained more of a client's recovery than was permitted
by statute, 65 where the attorney failed to appear at the disci-
plinary hearing, 6 or where the attorney unilaterally at-
tempted to change the terms of the fee agreement. 67
Most courts, however, will not strike down an attorney's
contingent fee recovery just because the fee paid turns out to
be greater than the value of the services rendered'" or on the
ground that the proportion of the claim to be retained by the
attorney happens to be large. 19 Generally, though, contingent
fee contracts that provide for an exorbitant percentage of a
client's proceeds have been held to be void and subject to
modification by the courts. 70
C. The Reasonableness Approach
Another standard against which contingent fees are judged
is whether the fees are reasonable.17' In Wiener v. United Air
148 Foshee v. Lloyds, 643 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1981).
In re Gillard 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978).
165 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assoc. v. Hatcher, 452 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1969).
146 In re Hartzog, 257 S.C. 84, 184 S.E.2d 116 (1971).
167 In re Hamm, 79 Wis.2d 1, 255 N.W.2d 308 (1977).
I" See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 333 Mo. 478, 63 S.W.2d 146 (1933) (approving a con-
tingent fee contract which provided for conveyance of land to attorney in will contest
defense matter); Domroe v. Kessler, 16 App. Div. 2d 791, 228 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1962)
(enforcing a one-third contingent fee in life insurance proceeds suit); Adams v. Dod-
son, 106 A.2d 501 (D.C. 1954) (allowing attorney recovery of contingent fee for filing
client's claim for army retirement pay).
16 High Point Casket Co. v. Wheeler, 182 N.C. 459, 109 S.E. 378 (1921) (holding
that the defendant had no standing to complain that one-third of plaintiff's award
went to plaintiffs' lawyers); Moyers v. City of Memphis, 135 Tenn. 263, 186 S.W. 105
(1916) (upholding a contingent fee of fifty percent of clients' recovery).
170 See United States v. 115.128 Acres of Land, More or less in Newark, New
Jersey, 101 F. Supp. 796, 799 (D.N.J. 1951).
171 See Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. Kenelly,
37 Colo. App. 217, 547 P.2d 260 (1976); In re Estate of Thompson, 426, Pa. 270, 232
A.2d 625 (1967); Gruskay v. Simenauskas, 107 Conn. 380, 140 A. 724 (1928); See also
1982]
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Lines, 72 the court allowed the attorney to enforce his one-
third contingent fee contract as to the adult claimants in a
wrongful death suit, but limited the attorney's fee with re-
spect to the minor claimants' awards to twenty-two percent,
applying a reasonableness standard. 1 7  In Hoffert v. General
Motors Corp., 4 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
district court's decision to limit the plaintiffs' law firm's con-
tingent fee recovery to one-fifth of a $2,500,000 judgment,
rather than enforce the fee contract's "one-third" provision. 75
The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's recovery on the
contract because the district court had made sufficient factual
findings to support its conclusion that one-fifth of the plain-
tiffs' clients' recovery was a reasonable fee.' 71 The district
court grounded its power to set a reasonable attorney's fee on
its equitable jurisdiction to resolve any questions it had con-
cerning the settlement of the case, because the plaintiffs' at-
torneys had invoked the court's equitable jurisdicition by ask-
ing it to approve the settlement agreement. 77
In Anderson v. Kennelly, 17 the Colorado Supreme Court
looked to whether a reasonable relationship existed between
the attorney's contingent fee and the attorney's efforts.' 79 In
holding that no such relationship existed,18 0 the court set
aside the plaintiff attorney's one-third contingent fee.' 5 ' In
Anderson, the plaintiff's husband had been killed in an auto-
mobile accident.18s The plaintiff hired an attorney to aid in
the collection of her husband's life insurance policy, which
Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 701 (1967).
"1 237 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
"' Id. at 96. See also Cappel v. Adams, 434 F. 2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1970) (upholding a
one third contingent fee as to the adult claimants; reducing the amount of contingent
fee from one third to one fifth as to the minor children claimants).
1,4 656 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981).
... Id. at 166.
1" Id.
1" Id. at 165.
178 37 Colo. App. 217, 547 P.2d 260 (1976).
'7o 547 P.2d at 261.
180 Id.
1oi Id.
'$' Id. at 260.
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provided that life insurance coverage would continue thirty-
one days after enlistment in the military.18 3 On June 22, 1971,
the plaintiff's husband enlisted in the service, 84 and on July
22, 1971, he was killed in an auto accident. " The widow erro-
neously believed that her husband had enlisted on June 20,
1971.186 The widow went to the judge advocate's office and
was advised to retain a private attorney. 8 7 The widow talked
with an attorney and agreed to hire him on a one-third con-
tingent fee basis. 188 The attorney, in negotiating with the in-
surance company, discovered the plaintiff's husband's correct
enlistment date, and, within a few days, the insurance com-
pany paid the amount due under the deceased's life insurance
policy.' 89 In both the trial and appellate courts, the widow was
successful in her action to set aside the fee, because "little
skill or effort" on the attorney's part was required to perform
the service for which the attorney was hired. 90
In Krause v. Rhodes,' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a district court's approval of a settlement arrangement
under which a private contingency fee contract between the
plaintiffs and an attorney was disregarded. 92 In Krause, the
original counsel for twelve of the fourteen plaintiffs in the
1970 Kent State cases9 3 appealed from the district court's or-
ders which limited his fee to $33,740 out of a settlement fund
totalling $675,000.9"4 The attorney argued on appeal that the
district court did not have power to invalidate the contingent
:1C Id. at 260-61.
84 Id. at 260.
18I d.
ISO Id. at 260-61.




191 640 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1981).
"I Id. at 218.
193 The suits stemmed out of the May 4, 1970 incident on the campus of Kent
State University in which nine persons were injured and four others killed by mem-
bers of the Ohio National Guard. The plaintiffs based their damage claims on 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 640 F.2d at 215 n.1.
IN Id. at 215-16.
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fee contract. 95 The district court had based its decision to
limit the attorney's fee upon the traditional power of a trial
court to adjudicate fee disputes between litigants and their
lawyers. 19' The chief justification for the district court's deci-
sion was the nature of the settlement agreement itself: the
State of Ohio, though not a party to the litigation, offered to
pay the plaintiffs $675,000 in full settlement, provided that
only $50,000 of the fund would be paid in attorneys' fees, and
$25,000 would be paid as out-of-pocket expenses. 197 Thus, in
light of the length of the litigation1" and the fact that the
attorney seeking additional compensation played no part in
creating the settlement fund'" because he had only repre-
sented his clients in the first of two trials, the court of appeals
held that the district court's order awarding the attorney a
reasonable fee was not an abuse of discretion.2 00
Despite its appeal, the reasonableness standard has been
criticized on two grounds. First, it is argued that use of a rea-
sonableness standard of reviewing contingent fees may dis-
criminate against personal injury lawyers, because the fees of
lawyers who bill on an hourly basis are rarely subject to judi-
cial scrutiny.20' It is argued that clients who enjoy long-stand-
ing relationships with their lawyers do not often complain
about hourly fees that may actually be excessive, because the
professional relationship will be ruined by the client suing his
lawyer over a fee.20 2 The fee-challenging client would thus
18 Id. at 216-17.
'" Id. at 217.
:9 Id. at 216.
" The plaintiffs' complaints, filed in 1970, were originally dismissed. Id. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal in Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), but
the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the eleventh amendment did
not bar the actions. Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
The first trial resulted in verdict for the defendants. Krause v. Rhodes, 640 F.2d
214, 216 (6th Cir. 1981). Later, American Civil Liberties Union counsel took over the
plaintiffs' case, and prosecuted a successful appeal. Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978). The parties were in the midst of
their second trial when a settlement accord was reached. Krause v. Rhodes, 640 F.2d
214, 216 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 218.
'"Id.
01 R. ARONSON, supra note 11, at 13.
202 Id.
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face more attorneys' fees as well as the task of breaking in a
new lawyer.2 Often the business client may find it easier to
pay the fee and pass on the extra cost to consumers.04
Second, it has been suggested that the reasonableness ap-
proach of reviewing contingent fee contracts has no justifiable
basis for the reason that it has no application in cases other
than those in which the court alone has the statutory author-
ity to set attorneys' fees.20 In International Travel Arrang-
ers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 0 the Eighth Circuit recog-
nized the distinction between a reasonableness approach and
a more lax "outer limits of reasonableness" standard and
awarded the plaintiff's attorneys statutory attorneys' fees.20
The court, however, disregarded a thirty-nine percent contin-
gent fee contract agreed to by the plaintiff and its lawyers.208
D. Court Promulgated Fee Regulations
Some courts have abandoned the ad hoc approach to re-
viewing contingent fee contracts and have adopted formalized
contingent fee schedules and rules.2 09 They justify the pro-
mulgation of these schedules on their inherent power to pre-
scribe rules of practice 10 and procedure in order to properly
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 See Comment, Judicial Power Over Contingent Fee Contracts: Reasonableness
and Ethics, 30 CASE W. RES. 523, 529-30 (1980). For an extensive citation of statutory
authorization of federal court power to set attorneys' fees, see S. SmsER, supra note
15, at 95-97.
100 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980) (contingent fee in antitrust suit).
20, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
208 623 F.2d at 1277.
09 See, e.g., N.D. ILL. CT. R. 39 (1981) reprinted in ILL. PRAc. ACT. RuLES 281-83
(West 1981); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 928 (1981), reprinted in MICH. CT. R. (West 1981);
CODE OF RULES FOR THE DiSTRICT COURTS 1 (Minn. 1981); reprinted in MINN. RuLES
OF COURT 331 (West 1981); N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7 (1974) (upheld in American Trial Law-
yers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974)); N.Y. CT.
R. § 603.7(a)(3) (upheld in Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d
491 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7 (West
1981), reprinted in WEST'S OKLAHOMA COURT RULES & PROCEDuRE 726 (1980-81). See
also the fee schedule applicable to federal seamen's personal injury cases, upheld in
Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973).
210 Some courts have pointed out that judicial power to regulate the professional
activities of attorneys that practice before them rests on the foundation that lawyers
are "officers of the court." See In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1949); In re
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administer justice.2 1 These fee rules usually limit the amount
of contingent fees to specified percentages of a client's recov-
ery, i.e., one-fourth of the amount recovered if the case is set-
tled before trial, one-third if the case is tried and the client
receives a monetary award, and one-half of the client's award
if the case is successfully appealed. 12 The advantage to this
approach is that lawyers are provided with certainty as to the
amounts they may charge clients as contingent fees. 213 Judi-
cially-developed fee schedules have been criticized, however,
on the ground that the schedules deprive poor claimants of
important rights by making it unprofitable for lawyers to
charge contingent fees.2" Also, two appellate courts have in-
validated lower courts' efforts to uniformly regulate contin-
gent fee contracts.2 " The modern trend, though, is to uphold
court-made fee schedules.2 1
In the case In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois
on May 25, 1979 (the DC-10 crash case), 7 federal judges in
the Northern District of Illinois have been utilizing their
rulemaking and equitable powers to help ensure that contin-
gency fees received by plaintiffs' lawyers are not excessive.2 8
Local court rules require attorneys to file their contingency
fee contracts with the court, and to file closing statements
McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419, 132 N.E.2d 113, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956); In re
Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 66 A.2d 675 (1949).
"' See, e.g. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) for such a justification.
ig See, e.g., MiCH. GEN. CT. R. 928 (1981).
See Suggested Changes in the Contingent Fee System 19 FED'N INS. COuNS. Q.
76, 82 (1968-69). "[Jjudicial review [of contingent fee contracts] ...would preserve
for claimants' lawyers and claimants the adequacy of the fee and award to the claim-
ant . . . ." Id.
$14 See H. Gair, Contingency Fees! Bane or Boon?, 25 Is. CoUNs. J. 453, 457 (1958)
"iot]he power to regulate the [contingency fee] in advance by fiat is the power to
destory the cause of action by making it unprofitable for lawyers to engage in that
practice.").
" See Shannon v. Cross, 245 Mich. 220, 222 N.W. 168 (1928) (overruled by a later
court rule); Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 178 (1949).
See also supra note 219 and accompanying text.
:10 See supra note 207.
,7 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that where there is a true conflict between
the laws of states having equal interests, the law of the place of the injury is to be
used).
Sil See Warden, Should a Lawyer Make $10,000 an Hour?, STUDENT LAW., April
1981, at 20, [hereinafter cited as Warden].
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itemizing the amount of the fee, the method by which the fee
is determined, and any expenses deducted from the client's
recovery.2 19
Court records show that a few attorneys representing dece-
dents' estates in the DC-10 crash litigation have received con-
tingent fees amounting to one-third of decedents' estates' re-
coveries for expending minimal amounts of time.2 20  For
example, one law firm, representing the family of a physician
who was killed in the airplane crash, negotiated a settlement
agreement with the defendants under which the decedent's
family was to recover $1,150,000.221 Prior to the settlement,
the firm filed probate papers but took no depositions (since no
lawsuit was filed).2 2 It was estimated that the firm invested
twenty-five to thirty-five hours on the case.223 The firm re-
ceived one-third of the $1,150,000 settlement, in accordance
with its contingent fee contract with the decedent's family.22 4
Because liability is not always contested by the defendants
in air crash suits,2 25 perhaps a more reasonable fee arrange-
ment in cases where fault is not at issue may be a contin-
gency-hourly combination fee. Under this type of arrange-
ment, the client would pay the attorney a retainer, and the
lawyer would receive, for example, ten percent of the client's
119 N.D. ILL. CT. R. 39 (1981), reprinted in ILL. PRAC. ACT. & RULES 281-83 (West
1981). One of the federal judges presiding over the litigation said that:
you have to get a little worried when you see some of these percentage
fees in relatively early settlements in these cases in which there is no
contested liability, and the amounts are substancial . . . . I do not
think judges can stand by and watch lawyers gouge clients and do
nothing about it.
Transcript of Hearing, Nov. 6, 1980, In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois,
on May 25, 1979. For a complete discussion of the DC-10 crash case contingent fee
issues, See Craft, Factors Influencing Settlement of Personal Injury and Death
Claims in Aircraft Accident Litigation, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 895, 919-26 (1981).
:go See Warden, supra note 218, at 21-23.
1I Id. at 20-22.
:2 Id. at 21.
"' Id.
4, Id. When one lawyer of the firm was asked by an investigative reporter to jus-
tify the fee, he stated "we don't have to justify what we charge to anyone." Id. at 21-
22.
"0 Liability was not contested by the defendants in the DC-10 crash case. Id. at 21.
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recovery.22 Because there is no doubt that the client will re-
cover some amount of money from the defendant, and be-
cause the lawyer should only earn fair compensation for his
efforts,227 the lawyer should not be permitted to receive a
windfall amounting to one-third of the client's recovery.228
IV. CONCLUSION
To curb abuses of a fee arrangement 22 9 that has generally
served both the legal profession and public well,230 courts have
imposed restrictions on the ability of lawyers to contract for
contingent fees.23' These limitations do not interfere with the
lawyers' right to freely contract with clients, because the re-
strictions are applications of the inherent power of the judi-
cary to oversee the activities of lawyers as officers of the
court 232 and to ensure that fiduciary2 33 and ethical234 stan-
dards are not breached. The ethical approach 2 , of reviewing
contingent fees will be merged with the reasonableness ap-
proach230 if the proposed Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (Model Rules) are adopted.3 7 The proposed Model
Rules would eliminate the distinctions among Disciplinary
Rules, Ethical Considerations, and Canons in the present
Code.23 8 The provision in the Model Rules relating to fees
would require that contingent fee contracts be in writing" 9
=' Clermont & Currivan, supra note 4, at 530, 581.
"7 Grady, supra note 46, at 21.
220 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 4, at 581.
:1 See supra note 69-142 and accompanying text.
.SO See supra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.
I" See supra note 143-219 and accompanying text.
:3 See supra note 210.
33 See supra notes 117-142 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 151-170 and accompanying text.
236 Id.
s See supra notes 171-208 and accompanying text.
"7 The American Bar Association, at its August, 1982 Annual Meeting, postponed
deciding whether to adopt the Model Rules. Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 18, 1982, at
27, col. 1.
I" See Moser, The Model Rules: Is one Format Better than the Other?, 67 A.B.A.
J. 1624, 1625 (1981).
,39 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b) (Final Draft 1981), re-
printed in A.B.A. J. 1300-1331) (pullout supp. 1981). The proposed Rule 1.5(b) pro-
vides that:
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and would require attorneys to furnish clients with fee state-
ments reflecting the outcome of the case and showing the re-
mittance to the client.24 0 Additionally, the proposed Model
Rules provide simply that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasona-
ble, ' 24 1 instead of requiring, as does the current Code, that a
lawyer's fee cannot be "clearly excessive. ' 24  The new Model
Rules, by their simplicity, may help lawyers determine
whether they may be engaged in questionable conduct,2 43 but
do not go far enough. The Model Rules should include a re-
quirement that lawyers apprise clients of alternative methods
of financing legal services (i.e., an hourly fee), and should pro-
hibit the use of a contingent fee where a client can afford to
pay an hourly fee,24 for the reason that use of the contingent
fee has no legal basis if a client can pay a fixed or hourly
fee.245 It must be remembered that the contingent fee was
originally developed to provide access to the legal system for
those who could not afford to hire counsel.24 Enforcement of
new ethical standards may deter abuse of the contingent fee
[t]he basis or rate of a lawyer's fee shall be communicated to the client
in writing before the lawyer renders substanial services in a matter
except when: (1) an agreement as to the fee is implied by the fact that
the lawyer's services are of the same general kind as previously ren-
dered to and paid for by the client; or (2) the services are rendered in
an emergency or where a writing is otherwise impractical.
Proposed Rule 1.5(c) provides that:
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered except in a matter in which a contingent fee is pro-
hibited by law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including
the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the
event of settlement, trial or appeal, expenses to be deducted from the
recovery, and whether expenses are to be deducted before or after the
contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee mat-
ter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating
the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the re-
mittance to the client and the method of its determination.
240 Id. Rule 1.5(c).
24' Id. Rule 1.5(a).
,' See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
M See Moser, The Model Rules: Is One Format Better Than the Other?, 67 A.B.A.
J. 1624 (1981).
'" See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1980).
1,5 See Grady, supra note 46, at 21.
' See Corboy, supra note 38, at 37.
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and therefore may be a step toward gaining the public confi-
dence and trust which the bar requires.""
217 See Burger, supra note 5, at 387.
Less money is still being spent nationally on professional discipline
than may accrue to lawyers in one big case. . . . If we are to maintain
public confidence in [the legal] profession, it is imperative that courts
and local and state bar associations take positive action to deal with
every manifestation of professional misconduct. This must be done
fearlessly and with fairness to the public, the profession, and the indi-
viduals involved.
